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KEEP CALM AND PLEAD ON: WHY NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SHOULD TEMPER FEARS ABOUT
PLEADING PLAUSIBILITY
Alex D. Silagi°
I.

Introduction
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,2 the Court’s unexpected take on pleading led a majority of civil proceduralists to treat
these decisions with apprehension and disappointment.3 Most considered the decisions a drastic
departure from a century of precedent in favor of liberal notice-pleading standards that
threatened to close the gates of justice to many meritorious, but inexactly pleaded, claims. 4 On
the other hand, those that agreed with the decisions felt that they constituted a much needed
check on wasteful litigation and expensive discovery battles based on no more than the most
speculative of legal theories.5
Rarest of all are the commentators that predicted a calmer application of the cases’
“plausibility” language.6 This Comment aligns itself with this small group by focusing on recent
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1
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010); Benjamin
Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2010); Suja A.
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010).
4
See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the
Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (criticizing “plausibility”
pleading and its effect on civil actions in general and civil rights cases in particular, where informational inequities
abound).
5
See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1092 (2009) (“Twombly must be
viewed as part of a broader trend in which the Court recognizes the importance of imposing real and meaningful
judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage, particularly as cases become more costly and complex to litigate.”).
6
See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“Rather than
decrying Twombly as a radical departure and seeking to overturn it, this Article instead emphasizes Twombly's
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empirical studies and case law surveys that show how little has changed since Twombly and
Iqbal.
Perhaps it is best at the outset to say what this Comment does not do. This Comment
does not take a position on whether the Supreme Court was right to make its changes in the two
decisions. That is for another conversation and, indeed, tomes could be made from the many
articles written on the topic. Instead, this Comment has two main goals: first, to synthesize and
analyze the most recent empirical data on the current state of pleading, which lead to the
conclusion that Twombly and Iqbal did not cause the much-feared seismic shift to pleading that
many predicted; and second, to suggest reasons for these unexpected results. The upshot of the
Comment is to plan the appropriate next steps for pleading standards given the much needed,
tempered reevaluation put forth below.
Part II of this Comment will explain the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal. Beginning with Twombly, the first of the two to go before the Court, this Part will address
the Court’s attempt to affect change in the standard for sufficient pleading under Rule 8—that is,
in relevant part, that a complaint must now satisfy a “plausibility” standard. Part II will then go
on to explain how the Court’s decision in Iqbal solidified that standard’s place in federal civil
trials. Part III will draw from representative sets of academic, judicial, and legislative materials
published in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal that express deep concern for, and confusion about,
the decisions.

By a significant measure, these voices represent the majority in the legal

community. Part III summarizes and synthesizes empirical studies conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and a case law survey conducted by
Andrea Kuperman, the Advisory Committee Clerk. Taken together, these Reports show that

connection to prior law and suggests ways in which it can be tamed.”); Adam N Steinman, The Pleading Problem,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).
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civil complaints are not affected by motions to dismiss any more than they were in the years
leading up to Twombly. Finally, Part IV will argue that the courts, collectively, are applying a
tempered interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal and will suggest common trends among the circuit
courts for applying “plausibility.” It will then suggest that these under-utilized findings demand
more attention than they are currently receiving, and that the case law shows a consistency of
application that future breaks from precedent or rule amendments would only upset.
II.

The Emergence of Plausibility: Twombly & Iqbal
A. Conley v. Gibson7
In 1957, the Supreme Court addressed the standards for sufficient pleading under Rule 8.8
Although not the first case before the Court concerning pleading standards, Conley v. Gibson
introduced the paradigmatic “no set of facts” language that would guide procedural precedent for
decades to come.9
Conley involved a labor relations suit brought under the Railway Labor Act by AfricanAmerican rail workers against their national union, local branch, and officers of both.10 Facing
allegations that they failed to adequately represent their African-American members against
discriminatory firings, the union defendants raised a successful motion to dismiss at the trial
7
8

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a) reads:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

The Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, largely in response to the perceived flaws inherent in previous
pleading regimes: English common law pleading, with its writ system and issue pleading; and code pleading,
which, in the United States, replaced the common law approach with fact pleading and recognized the civil action.
See Peter Julian, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism Of Generality”, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1179, 1184–87 (2010).
9
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45; see Smith, supra note 5, at 1069 (describing the language from Conley as a “longstanding
interpretation of the Federal Rules.”).
10
Id. at 42–43.
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level, which the Fifth Circuit affirmed.11 Writing for the Court, however, Justice Black reversed
the ruling, noting the following:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted
rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.12
The opinion continued:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail
the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is
“a short plain statement of the claim” that will give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.13
Relying on that proposition, the Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor.14
From a substantive prospective, the decision was just one piece in the larger push for
justice in the civil rights era.15 From a procedural scope, though, Conley was one of the most
pivotal cases of the twentieth century, and the Court’s “no set of facts” language was
fundamental to the modern understanding of pleading.16 Over the next half-century, the decision
was one of the most frequently quoted procedural expressions, and many considered it to be the
embodiment of the Federal Rules’ commitment to liberal pleading standards.17
B. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
Coming before the Court in late 2006, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly presented the high court
justices with the opportunity to address pleading standards for one of the first times since
Conley—this time, in an antitrust context. 18 William Twombly represented a putative class
consisting of local telephone and high-speed Internet service subscribers against a group of
11

Id.
Id. at 44–45 (emphasis added).
13
Id. at 47.
14
Id. at 48.
15
Andrew I. Gavil, Civil Rights and Civil Procedure: The Legacy Of Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2008).
16
Id. at 1.
17
Id. at 1–2.
18
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
12
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Incumbent Local Exchange Carries (ILECs). 19 As the opinion explains, ILECs made up a
system of regional service monopolies that resulted from the 1984 divestiture of AT&T’s local
telephone business.

20

These ILECs enjoyed their regional monopolies until the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, which obligated ILECs to share their networks with
competitors, known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).21
Under two circumstantial theories, Twombly alleged violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 22 which federally prohibits businesses from engaging in certain types of
anticompetitive conduct. 23 First, the complaint alleged that the ILECs engaged in parallel
business behavior in their respective regions against CLECs that frustrated and sabotaged the
CLECs operations so as to inhibit their growth.24 Second, it alleged that the ILCEs agreed not to
compete with each other, as inferred from their common failure to go after appealing business
opportunities in neighboring markets.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Southern
District of New York and the Second Circuit disagreed over whether the allegations met the
minimum for factual sufficiency to survive a motion to dismiss.26
Justice Souter, writing for the seven-member majority, reversed the Second Circuit’s
denial of the motion to dismiss and strongly addressed the Court’s Rule 8 precedent.27 Over
Justice Steven’s forceful dissent, Justice Souter took a hardline approach to Conley’s “no set of
19

Id. at 550.
Id. at 549.
21
Id. (citations omitted).
22
Id.; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restrain of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations”).
23
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 551.
26
Id. at 552–53. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that parallel business conduct was insufficient
on its own to state a claim under § 1, adding that the plaintiff needed to plead additional factual allegations that
tended to exclude the ILEC’s independent self-interest as an explanation. Id. at 552 (citing Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The Second Circuit reversed, holding that “plus factors are not
required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive.” Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (also quoted in Supreme Court’s opinion).
27
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
20
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facts” language that, in the Justice’s view, “has been questioned, criticized, and explained away
long enough.”28 The opinion locates this criticism’s source in Conley’s lenient language that, if
read literally, would allow wholly conclusory statements to survive a motion to dismiss and,
essentially, allow plaintiffs to engage in expensive discovery fishing expeditions. Courts, the
majority contended, have read Conley more as pleading guidelines, rather than apply its literal
requirements.29 As such, Justice Souter goes on to write in no uncertain terms, “after puzzling
the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.”30
In its place, the Court adopted what appeared to be a “plausibility” requirement.
The majority organized the Court’s Rule 8 precedent as follows:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds of
his “entitle[ment] to relief” require more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a case of action will not do . . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.31
As to how far above the speculative level factual allegations must reach, the opinion answered in
what seemed to be an antitrust context by asking for plausible grounds to read an anticompetitive agreement into a complaint.32 It then noted, though, “we do not require heightened
fact pleading on specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

28

Id. at 562.
Id.
30
Id. at 563. To add to the confusion this decision created, two week after the Justice Souter “retired” Conley’s
language, the Court seemed to reaffirm the standard that Conley represented in Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89
(2007). In that case, the Court, quoting Twombly and citing Conley, wrote, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). This apparent inconsistency lead several courts to question whether
Twombly did, in fact, abrogate Conley to the extent many predicted. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817
(8th Cir. 2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2)”).
31
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
32
Id. at 570.
29
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face.”33 With its opinion, the majority changed the direction of its pleading jurisprudence, but
the scope of this redirection was not entirely clear.
The entire Court did not view this redirection favorably. Justice Stevens, with whom
Justice Ginsburg joined in three of four parts, wrote a pointed dissent, calling Justice Souter’s
opinion “a dramatic departure from settled procedural law.”34
The crux of the dissent flowed from the historical motivations behind Rule 8 and
Conley’s connection to notice pleading’s history.35 Conley’s language, Justice Stevens wrote,
“captures the policy choice embodied in the Federal Rules and binding on the federal
courts.”36 In his view, the policy choice was to rework the procedural system from a stringent
code-pleading standard riddled with procedural pitfalls to a notice-pleading system, which made
it easier for plaintiffs to get their day in court”37 According to the dissent, the majority opinion’s
call for the pleading of facts was antithetical to this choice.38 Even worse, the majority’s reading
of Conley “express[es] an evidentiary standard, which the Conley Court had neither need nor
want to explicate.”39 Justice Stevens felt that the majority was rewriting the federal pleading
rules when the case’s resolution did not require that, and, further, did so outside of the
deliberative procedures that the federal courts have for making such a change. 40 Ultimately,
Justice Stevens viewed “plausibility” as a new heightened pleading standard.41

33

Id.
Id. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35
The intent-of-the-rules-drafters argument in Stevens’ dissent was adopted by many critics of the decision. See
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
36
Twombly, 556 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 579.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 580.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 582.
34
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C. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court made more explicit what its intentions
were in Twombly and how Rule 8 sufficiency-of-pleading issues should be addressed in the
future. John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the
FBI’s Director, petitioned the Supreme Court to address the Second Circuit’s affirmation of the
denial of their motion to dismiss Javaid Iqbal’s complaint.42 Iqbal, a Muslim and a citizen of
Pakistan, was arrested in the United States as part of a large investigation relating to the
September 11th terrorist attacks and was held in custody as a “high interest” detainee.43 After
his deportation pursuant to his guilty plea, Iqbal brought suit against a bevy of federal officials,
alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights during his detainment.44 As to Ashcroft and
Mueller, the complaint alleged Iqbal’s harsh confinement was the result of an unconstitutional
policy that the two men adopted on account of his race, religion, or national origin.45
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, reversed the Second Circuit’s
decision and held that Iqbal’s pleadings were insufficient.46 The issue called on the Court to
address ambiguities in its Twombly decision two years earlier. Returning to that opinion, Justice
Kennedy derived from Justice Souter’s analysis a two-step process for determining a complaint’s
sufficiency under Rule 8: first, the court need not accept as true any allegations contained in the
complaint that are merely legal conclusions; second, sufficient complaints must state a plausible
claim for relief.47

42

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
Id. at 667. “High-interest” detainees were held under the most restrictive conditions allowable in Federal prisons,
which prevent these detainees from communicating with the general prison population. Id. at 667–68.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 666.
47
Id. at 678–79.
43
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As to the first working principle, Justice Kennedy read out of Twombly that “threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”48 The Justice added, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” 49 The court must weed through a
complaint, searching for its “nub”—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations—and
isolate those for a determination of their sufficiency.50 As to the second principle, the court will
determine a complaint’s sufficiency by checking if the claims have been nudged “across the line
from conceivable to plausible.”51 This “context-specific task” that requires drawing on “judicial
experience and common sense” requires enough well-pleaded facts to “permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”52
Iqbal’s complaint, according to the majority that did not include Justice Souter, failed to
nudge across the line to plausibility.53 As per the first step, the majority located what it believed
to be conclusory allegations.

Labeled as nothing more than “formulaic recitations of the

elements” of a constitutional discrimination claim were such allegations as Ashcroft being “the
principal architect” of the invidious policy and that he “knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal]” to harsh confinement “solely on account of [his] religion,

48

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Id. at 678–679.
50
Id. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565–66).
51
Id. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
52
Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
53
Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
Interestingly, Justice Souter, who penned the Twombly decision, filed a dissenting opinion here, in which Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
49

9

race, and/or national origin …”54 Next, the Court assessed the two allegations that the majority
felt were entitled to assumptions of truth.55 The two allegations left stated:
[T]he [FBI] under the director of Defendant MEULLER, arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of
September 11” and “[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI
was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the
weeks after September 11, 2001.56
In spite of the petitioner’s intentions, the Court found an obvious alternative explanation
whereby anybody involved with the September 11th perpetrators would likely also happen to be
Islamic Arabs.57 Interestingly, though, the majority acknowledged that if they were required to
read the allegation as true, the complaint would survive the motion to dismiss.58 Nonetheless,
discrimination—that is, conduct done because of, not in spite of, religious and national origin—
as pleaded here was not a plausible conclusion.
Conversely, the dissenting Justices considered these allegations to be outside the realm of
mere legal conclusions.59 They felt that, contrary to the conduct in Twombly that was “consistent
with conspiracy, but just as much in line with” rational business strategy, here Iqbal’s allegations
of discriminatory policy and Ashcroft’s knowledge and deliberate indifference should be entitled
to assumptions of truth.60
Following its conclusion, the majority then answered three key arguments that attempted
define the decision’s scope. First, answering Justice Stevens’ question in Twombly, the Court
refused to limit its decision in that case to pleadings made in the antitrust context, noting that

54

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81 (citing complaint).
Id.
56
Id. at 682 (citing complaint).
57
Id. at 681–82.
58
Id. at 687.
59
Id. at 696–97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696–97.
55
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Twombly was based on the Court’s interpretation and application of Rule 8.61 Second, the trial
court’s case management and discovery controls do not temper the application of the plausibility
standard, even in cases like Iqbal’s where the trial judge made clear his desire to limit discovery
for the petitioners.62 Third, even though Rule 9 allows a party to plead intent “generally,” it does
mean that the sufficiency test for discriminatory intent is less stringent than Rule 8’s
requirements (i.e., conclusory statements need not be read as true).63
Ultimately, the majority’s attempts at clarification fell short. As Justice Souter’s dissent
illustrates, the application of a “plausibility standard” was still somewhat nebulous, especially
considering the Justice’s belief that the majority “misapplie[d] the pleading standard” that he
penned in Twombly. 64 The end result was two decisions that attacked head-on over a halfcentury of procedural precedent without fully reconciling the unanswered problems that these
decisions created.
III.

The Subsequent Panic: Responding to Twombly and Iqbal
While Twombly and Iqbal left significant procedural questions hanging in the air, it
opened the floodgates to a legal community in search of answers. Yet, as is the case with most
legal ambiguities, answers were not easy to come by.65 The lingering uncertainty about proper
pleading standards and access to courts bred anxiety among legal scholars, the judiciary, 66 and

61

Id. at 684.
Id. at 684–85.
63
Id. at 686–87.
64
Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65
See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We are not alone in finding the
opinion confusing.”) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.2007)).
66
In fact, not long after Iqbal, Justice Ginsberg publically remarked, “In my view, the [Iqbal] Court's majority
messed up the Federal Rules.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks for
Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_06-12-09.html.
62
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commentators67 and practitioners alike. When the legal community published on the issue, fear
and panic became the glass of fashion.
The overarching concern is that the Supreme Court’s decisions regress pleading standards
to the former, painfully strict fact or code pleading process.68 Twombly and Iqbal signaled for
many critics a move away from the simplicity for which Rule 8 asked for—a move that they
believe was not intended by the Rule’s drafters.69 The drafters’ intentions, critics often mention,
were guided by two procedural decisions: to reshape civil litigation to allow more access to
courts and to promote a complaint’s adjudication based on its merits, rather than dismissal
merely for procedural slip-ups.70 Such priority changes brought about by the Federal Rules were
guided by the philosophy that justice could only be served by allowing citizens to fully enforce
their rights. 71 This concept echoed the baseline democratic tenet upon which civil rights,
distributive justice, and equal opportunity rested.72 Thus, many critics fear that a “plausibility”
standard attacks the most basic policy goals that Rule 8 seeks to protect.
Fearing that the Rule’s fundamental principals were under attack, the backlash was
powerful. One author wrote, “[t]he Supreme Court should put a notice on all federal courthouse
67

See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2009, at A10. This article, which read Iqbal as “mak[ing] it much easier for judges to dismiss civil lawsuits right
after they are filed,” quotes Thomas C. Goldstein, an appellate lawyer with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld in
Washington: “Iqbal is the most significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litigation in the
federal courts.”
68
See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play On The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (“[T]he pleading requirement has become one of notice-plus. In reality, that is a
form of fact pleading by another name.”). In many ways, this baseline principle is guided by, and sometimes merely
reiterates, Justice Steven’s dissent in Twombly. C.f. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 832–33 (arguing that the
Court did not readopt fact pleading, but created an unprecedented test for “factual convincingness”).
69
Miller, supra note 65, at 19–20 (“By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and Iqbal, have transformed the
function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by imposing a more demanding standard that requires a greater
factual foundation than previously was required or originally intended.”); see also Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 433 (2008) (“[T]he Court's new standard is a direct challenge to the liberal ethos of
the Federal Rules”).
70
See Miller, supra note 68, at 4–5; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure In Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 956–61 (1987).
71
Miller, supra note 68, at 5.
72
Id.
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doors: STOP-ENTRANCE BY INVITATION ONLY!” 73

Another stated tersely, “notice

pleading is dead,” adding that the Court’s decision was “an unwarranted interpretation of Rule
8.”74 Yet another portended that the Court’s “brave new procedural world,” if adopted by the
lower courts, would lead to “a procedural revolution,” and the Court invented a “new and foggy
test” for judging the sufficiency of a complaint that has “destabilized the entire system of
litigation.75 These critics voices were supported by nascent statistical studies that suggested their
nightmares were becoming reality, as rates of granting motions to dismiss appeared to rise.76
Branching from this core philosophical concern were voices within specific substantive
areas that feared significant frustration of claimants within their respective areas. The most
vociferous opponents emerged from civil rights77 and labor and employment78 litigation areas.
In these areas, critics lamented the added power these decisions gave to federal trial
judges, who some scholars and practioners already believed to be making pleading very
burdensome for plaintiffs.79 This was a response, no doubt, to the lack of clarity in the decisions,

73

David A. Green, Friend or Foe: The Supreme Court’s “Plausibility” Standard Provides Another Barrier For
Plaintiffs In Employment Discrimination Cases, 39 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2011) (emphasis in original).
74
Spencer, supra note 68, at 431, 433.
75
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 823, 838.
76
By 2010, these studies suggested a greater frequency of dismissal under Twombly and Iqbal than under Conley.
See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
553, 556 (2010) (finding that after Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal, respectively, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were
increasingly granted); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118 (2010) (finding dismissals
increased from 54.2 percent to 64.6 percent in disability cases after Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with
Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014
(2009) (finding a higher rate of dismissals in Title VII cases after Twombly); see also Kendall W. Hannon, Note,
Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2008) (stating that Twombly has had “almost no substantive impact” except in
civil rights cases).
77
See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 74, at 556 (finding a significant increase in the rate of dismissal in a sample of
Westlaw cases, especially for civil-rights cases); Hannon, supra note 73, at 1837 (examining Westlaw cases and
finding that the courts do not seem to be dismissing cases at a significantly higher rate, except for civil-rights cases,
where the rate of granting dismissal jumped by eleven percent).
78
See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 3.
79
Id. at 521. For commentary on the general frustrations discrimination claims face, see, Kevin M. Clermont &
Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 103, 131–32 (2009).
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and the hypothetical scenarios where civil rights plaintiffs do not have necessary information at
hand pre-trial are not hard to imagine. Early empirical studies seemed to justify these concerns.
These studies, compiled by academics and law students, resulted in a disproportionate increase in
dismissal of civil rights cases in the months following the Court’s decisions.80 In one example of
the court’s perceived vigorous approach to these cases, one law student’s study, which sampled
data from 3,287 district court cases found that post-Twombly civil rights suits were 39.6% more
likely to be dismissed than other suits. 81 The strengthened gate-keeping power with which
Twombly and Iqbal furnished judges appeared to be making an immediate impact in exactly the
way these critics envisioned.
Indeed, concern reached a fever pitch when members of congress took action to address
these perceived problems. In October 2009, the House of Representatives called a hearing held
by the Judiciary Committee tellingly titled “Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.”82 Swiftly on the heels of the hearing, Senator Arlen Spector proposed a bill that echoed
the Judiciary Committee’s concerns. Titled the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 (the
“Act”), Senator Spector’s bill was designed to negate Twombly and Iqbal’s effect by reinstating
Conley’s “no set of facts” language.83 The Act would have provided that “Federal courts shall
not dismiss complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except
under the standards set forth in Conley v. Gibson . . . .”84 In Senator Specter’s introduction to the
Act, he indicated one of his major concerns with the Supreme Court’s decisions was “that the
80

See Seiner, supra note 73, at 1014 (“[A] higher percentage of decisions . . . granted a motion to dismiss in the
Title VII context when the courts relied on Twombly.”); Hannon, supra note 73, at 1815 (“The rate of dismissal in
civil rights cases has spiked in the four months since Twombly.”).
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Hannon, supra note 73, at 1838 (listing the data and explaining her methodology).
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Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009). During the hearing, civil rights
organizations’ representatives testified about Iqbal’s affect on access to courts, including employment
discrimination cases and civil rights cases.
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Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).

14

Court had closed the courthouse doors to plaintiffs with meritorious claims and limited the
private enforcement of public law.”85
The same year, a similar bill was introduced in the House. The Open Access to Courts
Act of 2009 was proposed, which provided that: “A court shall not dismiss a complaint under
subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would
entitle the plaintiff to relief.” 86 Both bills were referred to the Judiciary Committees but no
further action was taken. Nonetheless, these actions were symbolic of the deep concerns that
these cases engendered from all facets of the legal community.

IV.

Advisory Committee and Federal Judicial Center Studies
A. Advisory Committee Reports, 2007–2012
In 2007, immediately after Twombly, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules also took
notice that the Court’s two decisions were retiring Conley’s “no set of facts” language. The
Advisory Committee87 is charged to carry out “continuous study of the operations and effects of
85

156 CONG. REC. S11037-05, 2010 WL 5185279.
H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
87
A quick note about the structure of these entities is instructive.
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The Judicial Conference of the United States consists of the Chief Justice of the United States,
Chairman, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Chief
Judge of the Court of International Trade, the chief judges of the other twelve United States courts
of appeals and twelve district judges chosen for a term of three years by the judges of each circuit
at an annual judicial conference of the circuit. The Judicial Conference meets twice every year to
consider administrative problems and policy issues affecting the federal judiciary and to make
recommendations to Congress concerning legislation affecting the federal judicial system. The
Judicial Conference created the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing
Committee) and various Advisory Committees (currently one each on Appellate Rules,
Bankruptcy, Civil Rules and Criminal Rules). An Advisory Committee considers suggestions and
recommendations received from any source, new statutes and court decisions affecting the rules
and relevant legal commentary.
Thomas E. Baker, Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 323, 328–
29 (1991).
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the general rules of practice and procedure.”88 The Court’s engagement with Rule 8 was an issue
that fell directly within Committee’s province.
After Twombly, the Advisory Committee sought to address “[t]he basic question [is]
whether—and if so, when—to begin crafting formal rules amendments to channel, redirect,
modify, or even retract whatever changes in notice pleading flow from the Twombly.” 89
Nonetheless, the Committee thought it best at that moment to “keep a close watch on the
evolution of practice as courts seek to digest and implement [Twombly].”90 Contrary to the calls
for immediate reform from other sections of the legal community, the Committee decided on a
patient approach that would promote two goals. First, “to get a better sense of how others
understand Twombly, and how it has had whatever impact it has had in the very short term of its
present life. A second purpose is to consider the alterative opportunities that may be available to
amend present rule texts.”91
The Advisory Committee returned to the issue post-Iqbal and after a two year hiatus.
The Committee’s December 2009 Report revealed the results for some of the earliest empirical
work done on the issue, which was a compilation of statistics on the frequency of motions to
dismiss, and the rate of granting these motions.92 The Report noted that “the preliminary data
suggest that things have not changed much—the monthly rate of granting motions to dismiss
made on any ground was 13.15% of the monthly rate of filing cases during the 4 months before
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Baker, supra note 84, at 328–29 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (1988); Announcement, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,752
(1989); 110 S. Ct. no. 11, at CXXX–CXXXV (1990)).
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Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
December 7, 2007, at 12, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV122007.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, December 7, 2007].
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Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
December 8, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV122009.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, December 8, 2009].
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the Court decided Twombly, while the rate during the 4 months after the Iqbal decision was
13.78%.”93
On these findings, the Committee rightly held fast to its commitment to patient
investigation: “The questions are simply too important and too difficult to be resolved by rapid
response . . . .” 94

In a moment of calm insightfulness, and possibly acknowledging the

commentators’ responses, the Committee cautioned that “[f]aith challenged reacts vigorously,”
clearly recognizing that a rash response would not help the situation.95
In May of the following year, the Committee came to the conclusion that “it does not
seem that any dramatic changes have occurred” to pleading, even though impressions were still
tentative. 96 In the Report, more empirical work was provided that largely showed statistical
inactivity, but did point to possible issues within civil rights cases. The Report explained the
new data points: “The Administrative Office has carried on continually updated study of docket
information for all civil actions filed in the federal courts, beginning two years before the
Twombly decision.

The study counts all motions to dismiss, divided among several case

categories, and the dispositions.”97 The largely positive results were as follows: “The findings
show some increase in the rate of motions, and—for most case categories—no more than slight
increases in the rate of granting motions.” 98 But it also drew attention to the civil rights
categories for employment cases and miscellaneous cases:
The monthly average in employment cases for nine months before the Twombly
decision was 1,147 cases, 527 motions to dismiss (46% of cases), 169 motions
granted (15%), and 108 motions denied (9%). For nine months after Iqbal, the
93
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Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May
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monthly average was 1,185 cases, 533 motions to dismiss (45%),185 motions
granted (16%), and 80 motions denied (7%). The monthly average in other civil
rights cases for nine months before Twombly was 1,334 cases, 903 motions to
dismiss (68% of cases), 264 motions granted (20%), and 158 motions denied
(12%). For nine months after Iqbal, the averages were 1,362 cases, 962 motions
to dismiss (68%), 334 motions granted (25%), and 114 motions denied (8%).
These figures show a substantial increase in the percent of motions granted. But
they cannot show the explanation . . . .99
These preliminary Reports had holes, however, because the “Administrative Office data
base . . . does not permit distinctions between motions addressed to the pleadings and motions to
dismiss based on other grounds. Neither do the data reveal what happens after a motion to
dismiss is granted—whether defects are cured by amendment . . .”100 Nonetheless the findings
stood as an important signpost for the early direction of the conversation: patience was needed,
but potential emerging problems—particularly in civil rights cases—were not to be treated
lightly.
B. Federal Judicial Center Report101
Where the Advisory Committee felt its statistical data was under-inclusive, it requested
that the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study the filing and resolutions of motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim in much broader terms.102 Casting a far broader net, the FJC set out to
analyze the procedural dispositions of cases from 2006 to 2010.103 Over that range, the study
compared motion activity in twenty-three federal district courts, which included orders that do
not appear in legal reference systems like Westlaw.104 The project, published in March 2011, put
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Advisory Committee Report, December 8, 2009, at 2.
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JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL,
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http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter FJC REPORT].
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Id. at vii.
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Id. This date range, the Report notes, filters our unwanted cases, keeping only those that “neither anticipat[ed]
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forth a larger data pool on the issue than any other statistical study on the effects of Twombly and
Iqbal to date.105
The Report’s findings are significant. It revealed a general increase from 2006 to 2010 in
the rate of filing of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.106 In general, there was no
increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend.107 There was, in
particular, no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend in civil
rights cases and employment discrimination cases.108 Only in cases challenging mortgage loans
on both federal and state law grounds did the study find an increase in the rate of grants of
motions to dismiss without leave to amend, and many of these cases were removed from state
court to federal court.109 The Report noted that there was no reason to believe that the rate of
dismissals without leave to amend would have been lower in 2006 had such cases existed then.110

We selected the 23 federal district courts to be included in the study by identifying the 2 districts
in each of the 11 circuits with the largest number of civil cases filed in 2009. We also included the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On occasion we were unable to obtain access to
some of the courts’ codes necessary to identify all of the relevant motions. In such cases, we
chose the court in the circuit with the next greatest number of civil filings. These 23 district courts
account for 51% of all federal civil cases filed during this period.
Id. at 5.
Within these district courts, the Report’s researchers were able to a obtain considerable data sets. Instead
of using computerized legal reference systems, the study turned to the courts’ CM/ECF records to compile a fuller
set of cases with relevant motions. Id. at 5. This provided a more complete assessment than reference systems
because it more closely resembled excavation of files from the physical docket sheets. Id. Furthermore, while the
Report was able to assess far more cases than any other study to date, its authors chose to exclude cases filed by
prisoners and pro se parties, and controlled for differences in motion activity across federal district courts and across
types of cases and for the presence of an amended complaint. Id. at vii.
105
Id.
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Id. at vii.
107
Id.
108
FJC REPORT, at vii.
109
Id. This category of cases tripled in number during the relevant period in response to events in the housing
market.
110
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It added that there was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to
dismiss terminated the case.111
The Report further explained the results. The initial findings showed a dramatic, albeit
expected, increased rate of filing motions to dismiss. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim were filed in 6.2% of all cases in 2009–10, an increase of 2.2% over the filing rate for such
motions in cases in 2005–06.112 Adjusted estimates from the data indicate that the probability of
a motion to dismiss being filed in an individual case increased from a baseline of 2.9% of the
cases in 2006 to 5.8% of the cases in 2010. 113 In civil rights cases other than employment
discrimination, the likelihood of a motion to dismiss increased 0.4% from 2005–06 to 2009–
10.114 This increase, however, did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.115
The percentage of cases with one or more motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim was
higher in each month of 2009–2010 than in each month of 2005–06.116 Moreover, in 2009–10
there appeared to be a modest increase over time in the percentage of cases with such motions.117
The trend line for the percentage of cases in 2005–06 with motions to dismiss was flat over time
at just under 4%.118
According to the Report, however, judges are barely deciding these motions differently
than they would have in the pre-Twombly-Iqbal era. The Report recorded whether an order
denied the motion to dismiss in its entirety, granted all of the relief requested by the motion, or
granted some but not all relief requested by the motion.119 If the court allowed amendment of the
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complaint with regard to at least one claim that was dismissed, the analysts coded the motion as
granted with leave to amend.120 It first appears that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
were more likely to grant all or some of the relief requested in 2010 than in 2006.121 In 2010,
75% of the orders responding to such motions granted all or some of the relief requested by the
motion, compared with almost 66% of the orders in 2006.122 But closer inspection reveals that
the increase extends only to motions granted with leave to amend, with no increase found in
motions granted without leave to amend.123
C. Memorandum of Circuit Court Cases124
In addition to the strong numerical picture the FJC’s study paints, a memorandum
reviewing relevant case law was compiled by the Advisory Committee’s clerk, Andrea
Kuperman. Kuperman’s voluminous survey primarily focuses on Circuit Court decisions, with a
collection of district court cases in appendix, and spans over seven hundred pages. Right from
the beginning, Kuperman makes an important observation:
[T]he case law to date does not appear to indicate that Iqbal has dramatically
changed the application of the standards used to determine pleading sufficiency.
Instead, the appellate courts are taking a context-specific approach to applying
Twombly and Iqbal and are instructing the district courts to be careful in
determining whether to dismiss a complaint . . . The approach taken by many
courts may suggest that Twombly and Iqbal are providing a new framework in
which to analyze familiar pleading concepts, rather than an entirely new pleading
standard.125
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This observation falls in line with the FJC’s findings, but gives those numbers a much-needed
human glow. With the many cases that Kuperman reviewed, the major trend in judicial thought
process at the circuit level corroborates the numbers from the district court level.126
One of Kuperman’s most interesting findings comes from a 2010 First Circuit decision
authored by then-retired Justice Souter, sitting by designation. 127 In Sepúlveda the court
explained a relatively tempered framework for plausibility.128 In that case, two public school
teachers sued the Puerto Rico Department of Education, its Secretary, and the school director for
failure to accommodate an employee’s disability as required by Title I of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794.129 One teacher alleged that five years after he suffered a stroke, the school took
away accommodations made for him until that point, and required him to take on a larger-thanusual number of students. 130 He claimed “that the new arrangement [was] an unreasonable
refusal to accommodate, resulting in emotional consequences with physical symptoms requiring
treatment.”131 Similarly, the other teacher alleged that, after receiving accommodations from the
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Kuperman’s findings also bolster the FJC’s findings by pointing to eight courts of appeal that have since reversed
a number of early district court decisions to dismiss actions. See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir.
2010) (reversing dismissal of pro se prisoner’s claims of violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); W. Penn Allegheny
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school for several years after suffering a throat condition, she too was forced to take on an
increased class size.132 The district court dismissed both claims.133
The First Circuit vacated the orders that held the complaints to be insufficient.134 After
setting forth the appropriate pleading standard that included language from Twombly and Iqbal,
as well as Conley, the court decided that the district court erred by demanding “more than
plausibility.”

135

accommodations

From the two sets of alleged facts—first, that the school provided
for

several

years,

and,

second,

that

the

school

changed

these

accommodations—each complaint was sufficient. Justice Souter explained:
To be sure, this sequence of alleged facts does not describe a causal connection in
terms of the exact psychological or physiological mechanism by which each
plaintiff’s capacity continues to be overwhelmed. But reading the allegations
with the required favor to the plaintiff means accepting the changes in class size
as the only variable, from which one would infer that there probably is some
causal connection between the work of a doubled class size and the physical and
emotional deterioration of the disabled teacher.136
He further explained that “Twombly cautioned against thinking of plausibility as a standard of
likely success on the merits; the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and
read in a plaintiff’s favor.”137 The opinion concluded:
None of this is to deny the wisdom of the old maxim that after the fact does not
necessarily mean caused by the fact, but its teaching here is not that the inference
of causation is implausible (taking the facts as true), but that it is possible that
other, undisclosed facts may explain the sequence better. Such a possibility does
not negate plausibility, however; it is simply a reminder that plausibility of
allegations may not be matched by adequacy of evidence. A plausible but
inconclusive inference from pleaded facts will survive a motion to dismiss, and the
fair inferences from the facts pleaded in these cases point to the essential
difference between each of them and the circumstances in Twombly, for example,
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in which the same actionable conduct alleged on the defendant's part had been
held in some prior cases to be lawful behavior.138
With this, the court instituted a tempered framework for “plausibility” that the Circuit continued
to abide by in future cases.139
Similarly, the Second Circuit’s reading of “plausibility” provided a tamer application
than its district court applied.140 In Ideal Steel, the plaintiff, Ideal Steel, brought an action under
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-68,
against its competitor.141 After years of complicated litigation, the district court dismissed one
plaintiff’s § 1962(a) claim on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently alleged facts to
show that the defendants’ alleged racketeering activity was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.142
The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, noting that the lower court’s demanded level
of specificity at the pleading stage was “not justified by Twombly.”143 There, the higher court
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Id. (citation omitted) (Emphasis added).
See, e.g., Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2011). There, the court echoed Justice Souter:
We hasten to add that we offer no view on the merits of his claim. The question at this stage of
the case is not “the likelihood that a causal connection will prove out as fact.” Sepúlveda–Villarini,
628 F.3d at 30. Rather, “the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read
in a plaintiff's favor.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8, (“[W]hen a complaint
adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court's assessment that the
plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the
satisfaction of the factfinder.”). Here, the pleaded facts support “[a] plausible but inconclusive
inference” of discrimination based on disability, Sepúlveda–Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30, and
[Plaintiff] is therefore entitled to proceed with his ADA claim.
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viewed the lower court’s mischaracterization and misapplication of Twombly as grounded in the
lower court’s overly-stringent reading of the allegations.144 After reminding the lower court that
Twombly only requires “[f]actual allegations [that are] enough to raise a right to relief about the
speculative level . . . i.e., enough to make the claim ‘plausible,’” the opinion found “nothing
implausible” in the plaintiff’s allegations.145 For that reason, the court concluded, the dismissal
was in error.
The Sixth Circuit, in Harvard v. Wane County applied Twombly and Iqbal in a similar
vein.146 In that case, an infant, through her guardian, brought a § 1983 action against employees
of the Wayne County Jail. 147

The mother alleged that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to the infant’s serious medical needs after the child was born in the jail. 148
Essentially, the mother alleged that she went into labor while she was detained and, after hours
without medical assessment by prison officials, began the birthing process in her cell.149 When
she was finally treated by EMS, the child was born with no heart rate or respiration. 150 The child
was resuscitated, but suffered severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy.151
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aid [Plaintiff’s] case, but its absence does not render implausible that a business continued to adhere to the
conspiratorial plan. The district court gave improper weight to the absence of reaffirmation.”). The “smoking gun”
language comes up in other circuits, as well, and serves as a reminder that “plausibility” did not conflate pleading
and discover. See, e.g., In re Test-Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2165 (2011) (“Discovery may reveal the smoking gun or bring to light additional circumstantial evidence that
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Following the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. In explaining its standards for motions to dismiss, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
plausibility standard does “not alter the basic rule that plaintiffs must plead only the basic
elements of a claim, not develop all of the facts necessary to support the claim.” 152 Under this
application, the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient under the standard.153
Circuit cases with similar analytical processes abound in Kuperman’s memorandum. Of
course, the case law includes the inevitable decisions that take aggressive approaches to
“plausibility,” but those instances are the minority.154 Instead, the survey reveals a relatively
stable, tempered application of “plausibility” pleading that comports with FJC’s and Advisory’s
Committee’s statistical data.
V.

Analysis
A. The Value of Empirical Data
As a whole, empirical evaluations of procedural standards are underemphasized in the
debate about pleading standards. Yet the value of these studies cannot be overstated. They offer
the most thorough analysis of pleading standards under Rule 8, and they provide disinterested
feedback that is needed to guide the conversation. Numbers play a rare part in legal discourse,
but they do have a place here. In rare circumstances, statistical data is the best guidepost for next
steps, particularly where the prevailing attitude misrepresents the realities of the situation.
Without doubt, Twombly and Iqbal will never be held as the model of clarity, and commentators
were right to express deep concern for the potential implications. It appears now, though, that
152
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this anxiety has gathered too much momentum—toward “plausibility’s” speculative effects,
rather than its actual effects.
And where statistical data is given attention, the wrong studies are being privileged. In
particular, independent studies conduct by Professors Colleen McNamara 155 and Patricia
Hatamyar, 156 and law student Kendall W. Hannon 157 have gained the most attention. These
studies, all of which preceded the FJC’s Reports, are under-inclusive and surveyed case law that
was still only in its budding stages.158
Professor Hatamyar’s statistical pool was derived from a random selection of 1,200
district court cases, taken from the two years before and after Twombly, as well as the four
months after Iqbal. 159 Hatamaya, herself, cautioned that “the short time span and smaller
number of Iqbal cases counsel caution in interpreting the data.”160 Professor McNamara used an
even smaller sample size of 196 district court cases that cited Iqbal within the first six months
following the decision’s publication, using the commercial legal database Westlaw to compile
the list.161 Kendall Hannon’s study engaged in the largest data pool, with 2,212 cases citing
Conley and 1,075 citing Twombly, but was published before the Court decided Iqbal.162
The FJC’s pool of cases was significantly larger. The study examined motion activity in
2006 and 2010 and, importantly, compiled cases based on their orders made available through
the federal district court records rather than only opinions published in computerized legal
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reference systems. 163 The analysts selected cases from twenty-three district courts, with two
districts from each of the eleven circuits with the most civil cases filed in 2009, including the
district court for the District of Columbia. 164 The result was a staggering 49,443 cases with
12(b)(6) motions filed within ninety days of filing the case in 2006, and 52,925 cases with the
same posture in 2010.165 Kendall Hannon’s 3,387-case pool—the largest of the three—is only
roughly 3% of the FJC’s total. The FJC, with its greater resources and staff, was able to cover an
exponentially larger number of cases in order to determine a more complete picture of
“plausibility” application throughout the federal court system. But the picture is useless unless
commentators take time to look at it. Given the wealth of new information the FJC has made
available, and the indication that little has changed, the legal community should use this
information as the new starting-point for determining whether change is needed.

B. How the Courts are Reading “Plausibility”
Determining the necessity of change requires the availability of diverse sources.
Importantly, where the FJC Report is lacking in judicial analysis, Kuperman’s Advisory
Committee memo fills in the gaps. The survey focuses primarily on circuit court case law, which
enables it to describe the lower court application of “plausibility,” as well as discern whether the
intermediate courts support those applications or demand redefinition. By corroborating and
breathing life into the FJC’s numbers, Kuperman’s work serves as an important informational
reservoir from which to determine exactly how the courts are reaching a similar result as they
were before Twombly and Iqbal.
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Before either the FJC’s Reports or Kuperman’s memo were published, Professor Adam
Steinman argued for a reading of Supreme Court’s decisions that preserved pre-Twombly
precedent. 166

First, Professor Steinman noted the decisions could not have overruled pre-

Twombly authority, as such a rejection can only occur through the rule amendment process, not
through judicial interpretation of Rule 8; it is simply not within the Court’s power to effectuate
that type of change. 167 Second, even if Rule 8 could be reasonably interpreted to require a
stricter pleading standard, the fifty years of procedural precedent would insulate the Rule from
such interpretation.168 Specifically, Twombly only abrogates one line from all the cases – the “no
set of facts” language. Third, Justice Souter’s analysis of the “no set of facts” language was
inexact. 169 The language was, in practice, subject to a different, more sensible reading than
matched what Justice Souter endorsed in Twombly. Professor Steinman explains, Conley’s “no
set of facts” language,
did not preclude dismissal as long as any set of facts could entitle the plaintiff to
relief (the straw man that Twombly purported to strike down). Rather, this phrase
merely confirmed that speculation about the provability of a claim is typically not
a proper inquiry at the pleadings phase; provability is relevant only when it
appears ‘beyond doubt’ that the plaintiff cannot prove her claim.170
The end result, Professor Steinman writes, “is that lower courts have, essentially, a duty
to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with pre-Twombly case law.”171
Professor Steinman’s astute analysis of the cases has been largely confirmed by the
Reports, but several aspects of the decisions that Steinman did not anticipate have played a
recurring role in Kuperman’s case law.

Uncertainty in a complaint is proving to be less
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troublesome to litigants. First, a line in Twombly that garnered attention has ended up being a
source of taming “plausibility”: “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).”172 The line has become commonplace in circuit courts’ expressions of
the Rule 8 precedent,173 and implies an allowance of far more uncertainty at the pleading stage
than at first feared. By offering the assumption of truth to doubtful facts, plaintiffs appear to be
resorting to this expression to help nudge their claims away from merely threadbare assertions.
To further this reading, many courts have focused their analyses on the statement that “a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those
facts is improbable, and ‘that recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” 174 Here, courts have
picked up on the language of doubt – “improbable” and “remote and unlikely” – to acknowledge
that “plausibility” pleading, for all its terminological changes, is still just that – an inquiry into
pleadings, where discovery-like facts are not required.
Finally, Iqbal’s statement that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” 175 Rather than serve as a tool for arbitrary judicial
enforcement of “plausibility” as has been argued,176 this sentence has worked to preserve relative
consistency in determining sufficiency. Where the lack of clarity within Twombly and Iqbal
could lead to widely inconsistent results, judicial experience is consistently invoked to remind
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lower courts to read allegations under the full spectrum of Rule 8 precedent – that is, to reign in
judicial inquiries that interpret “plausibility” in an aggressive manner.
C. How should we respond?
The upshot of these results should guide the conversation in a less reactionary direction
by allowing the common law process to continue carving a path for “plausibility” pleading. 177
The primary fear that a quick response was needed to neutralize Twombly and Iqbal before it
affected countless litigants is quickly being extinguished.

The overarching concerns that

pleading was decentralized does not stand muster when compared to the trends that the FJC
Report indicates, and the changes proposed that relied on those concerns develop cracks in their
foundations.
A common approach to addressing “plausibility” is that change should come internally
through the Court’s overruling of Iqbal.178 One commentator has suggested that “[t]he best, and
easiest, fix to [the “plausibility”] problem is for the Iqbal case to be overruled and for Twombly
to be read according to the ‘transactional’ method’” instead of a “conclusory” method ushered in
by Iqbal. 179 But it is not clear that overruling the decisions would be justifiable under the
principles of stare decisis. Specifically, proponents of this approach would have to explain its
unworkability. While initial concerns about “plausibility” may have given rise to colorable
arguments for the standard’s unworkability, the case studies and reports suggest that is not the
case in practice. In fact, the lack of significant change between pre- and post-Iqbal empirical
177
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data suggests that these issues have not been exacerbated in any meaningful way by
“plausibility” itself.

Of course, that is not to say that the pleading as a whole could not use

revision; the doctrine is far from perfect. But what the numbers do tell us is that Twombly and
Iqbal are not the impetus for those problems. Without that critical link, any reasoning that
pleading standards need revision specifically because of these cases does not withstand muster.
If anything, the sweeping change that critics believe will re-centralize the pleading
process has the potential to do just the opposite. This holds especially true in regard to proposed
rule amendments. With any amendment, particularly to a rule that maintains the entryway to the
court, uncertainty in application will initially cause confusion and threatens to affect almost all
civil cases brought after that time.
Conversely, based on case development and data, the position that Twombly and Iqbal
did not break the federal pleading system should encourage the Advisory Committee to maintain
its current course. The devil, now, is in the details of the Twombly and Iqbal, and incremental
advancements of district and circuit courts’ understanding of “plausibility” will ensure that the
system can improve itself without risking a major, potentially unsettling jolt.
VI.

Conclusion
The FJC and Advisory Committee have advanced the conversation immensely with their
research. It is the legal community’s obligation now to acknowledge these results, and use them
to redirect any misguided positions. The solutions need to be reframed to account for the
tempered application of that precedent. Only then, with full attention given to the practicalities
of “plausibility,” can a legitimate reevaluation of Twombly, Iqbal, and the entire pleading
system be made. Nonetheless, while the reevaluation is being crafted, the main point still stands:
litigants can safely plead on.
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